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Under the unfavourable condition, the Am...

Under the unfavourable condition, the Amoeba withdraws its pseudopodia and secretes a three-layered hard covering or cyst around itself . This phenomenon is termed as

A

Binary fission

B

Sporulation

C

Budding

D

Encystation

Text Solution

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The correct Answer is:
D
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Ravi is a student of class IX in a Delhi school. This year all the students of class IX were going to visit Kashmir during the winter holidays alongwith some of their teachers. All the students were asked to pack heavy woolen clothes with them because winter in Kashmir is very severe. Ravi had recently studied a particular chapter in science. Keeping that in mind, Ravi also purchased a pair of special type of shoes from the market and packet it alongwith his luggage. When the students reached Srinagar, it was extremely cold. When the students got up in the morning next day, they were told that heavy snowfall is going on in this area since last night and that there were thick layers of snow all around their hotel. Most of the students had not seen snowfall before. So, all the students and teachers decided to walk and play on fresh falling snow. Ravi put on his special ordinary shoes while walking on snow. It was noticed that the feet of all other students and teachers wearing ordinary shoes were sinking into soft snow making it very difficult for them to walk on soft snow. But this was not so with Ravi. Ravi could walk easily even on soft snow (without his feet sinking into it). All the students were very jealous of Ravi. But the teachers were all praise for Ravi. (a) Which concept of science is involved in the incident which took place on soft snow? (b) Why do the feet of a student wearing ordinary shoes sink into soft snow? (c) What are the special shoes worn by Ravi called? How do they differ from ordinary shoes? (d) Explain why, by wearing special shoes, Ravi could walk easily on soft snow (without his feet sinking into soft snow). (e) What are a pair of long, narrow pieces of hard flexible material fastened under the feet for sliding very fast on the slopes of snow covered mountains called (which work on the same principle as snow shoes)? (f) What values are displayed by Ravi in this episode?

Amartya Sen wrote about the Indian tradition of skepticism and heterodoxy of opinion that led to high levels of intellectual argument. The power sector in India is a victim of this tradition at its worst. Instead of forcefully communicating, supporting and honestly and firmly implementing policies, people just debate them. It is argued that central undertakings produce power at lower tariffs and must therefore build most of the required extra capacities. This is a delusion. They no longer have access to low- cost government fonds. Uncertainty about payment reillains a reason for the hesitation of private investment. They had to sell only to SEBs (State Electricity Boards). SEB balance sheets are cleaner after . the ''securitisation" of the Rs 40,000 crore or so owed by SEBs to central government undertakings, now shown as debt instruments. But state governments have not implemented agreed plans to ensure repayment when due. The current annual losses of around Rs 28,000 crore make repayment highly uncertain. The central undertakings that are thejr main suppliers have payment security because the government will come to their help. Private enterprises do not have such assurance and are concerned about payment security, that must be resolved. By the late 1890s, improving the SEB finances was recognised as fundamental to power reform. Unbundling SEBs, working under corporate discipline and even privatisation and not vertically integrated state enterprises, are necessary for efficient and finandally viable electricity enterprises. Since government will not distance itself from managing them, privatising is an option. The Delhi model has worked. But. it receives no public support. The Electricity Act 2003, the APRDP (Accelerated Power Reform and Development Programme) with its incentives and · penalties, and the creation of independent regulatory commissions, were the means to bring about reforms to improve financial viability of power sector Implementation has been half-hearted and results disappointing. The concurrent nature of electricity in the Constitutiort impedes power sector improvement. States are more responsive to populist pressures than the central government, and less inclined to take drastic action against electricity thieves. Captive power would add significantly to capacity. I However, captive generation, three years after the Act enabled it, has added little to capacity because rules for open access , were delayed. Redefined captive generation avoids state vetoes on purchase lr sale of electricity except to state electricity enterprises. Mandating open access on state-owned wires to power regardless of ownership and customer would encourage electricity trading. The Act recognised electncity trading as a separate activity. A surcharge on transmission chsrges will pay for cross-subsidies. These were to be eliminated m time. Rules for open access and the quantum of surcharge by each state commission (under broad principles defined by the central commission) have yet to be announced by same. The few who have announced the surcharge have kept it so high that no tradmg can take place. Why are the central undertakings not capable of generating power -at low cost?

Knowledge Check

  • During encystation, Amoeba withdraws its pseudopodia and secretes a ………... layered hard covering or cyst around itself.

    A
    5
    B
    4
    C
    2
    D
    3

  • Under unfavourable conditions, Amoeba produces a three-layered dissemule. The phenomenon is

    A
    Sporulation
    B
    Encystment
    C
    Conjugation
    D
    Regeneration.

  • Amartya Sen wrote about the Indian tradition of skepticism and heterodoxy of opinion that led to high levels of intellectual argument. The power sector in India is a victim of this tradition at its worst. Instead of forcefully communicating, supporting and honestly and firmly implementing policies, people just debate them. It is argued that central undertakings produce power at lower tariffs and must therefore build most of the required extra capacities. This is a delusion. They no longer have access to low- cost government fonds. Uncertainty about payment reillains a reason for the hesitation of private investment. They had to sell only to SEBs (State Electricity Boards). SEB balance sheets are cleaner after . the ''securitisation" of the Rs 40,000 crore or so owed by SEBs to central government undertakings, now shown as debt instruments. But state governments have not implemented agreed plans to ensure repayment when due. The current annual losses of around Rs 28,000 crore make repayment highly uncertain. The central undertakings that are thejr main suppliers have payment security because the government will come to their help. Private enterprises do not have such assurance and are concerned about payment security, that must be resolved. By the late 1890s, improving the SEB finances was recognised as fundamental to power reform. Unbundling SEBs, working under corporate discipline and even privatisation and not vertically integrated state enterprises, are necessary for efficient and finandally viable electricity enterprises. Since government will not distance itself from managing them, privatising is an option. The Delhi model has worked. But. it receives no public support. The Electricity Act 2003, the APRDP (Accelerated Power Reform and Development Programme) with its incentives and · penalties, and the creation of independent regulatory commissions, were the means to bring about reforms to improve financial viability of power sector Implementation has been half-hearted and results disappointing. The concurrent nature of electricity in the Constitutiort impedes power sector improvement. States are more responsive to populist pressures than the central government, and less inclined to take drastic action against electricity thieves. Captive power would add significantly to capacity. I However, captive generation, three years after the Act enabled it, has added little to capacity because rules for open access , were delayed. Redefined captive generation avoids state vetoes on purchase lr sale of electricity except to state electricity enterprises. Mandating open access on state-owned wires to power regardless of ownership and customer would encourage electricity trading. The Act recognised electncity trading as a separate activity. A surcharge on transmission chsrges will pay for cross-subsidies. These were to be eliminated m time. Rules for open access and the quantum of surcharge by each state commission (under broad principles defined by the central commission) have yet to be announced by same. The few who have announced the surcharge have kept it so high that no tradmg can take place. The author thinks it appropriate to -

    A
    discuss any policy in details and make it fool proof instead of implementing it hastily.
    B
    follow Indian tradition meticulously as skepticism is essential for major decisions.
    C
    divert our energies from fruitlessly contracting policies to supporting its implementation wholeheartedly.
    D
    intellectual arguments and conceptualisation of every policy is definitely better than its enforcement.

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    Explore conceptually related problems

    Amartya Sen wrote about the Indian tradition of skepticism and heterodoxy of opinion that led to high levels of intellectual argument. The power sector in India is a victim of this tradition at its worst. Instead of forcefully communicating, supporting and honestly and firmly implementing policies, people just debate them. It is argued that central undertakings produce power at lower tariffs and must therefore build most of the required extra capacities. This is a delusion. They no longer have access to low- cost government fonds. Uncertainty about payment reillains a reason for the hesitation of private investment. They had to sell only to SEBs (State Electricity Boards). SEB balance sheets are cleaner after . the ''securitisation" of the Rs 40,000 crore or so owed by SEBs to central government undertakings, now shown as debt instruments. But state governments have not implemented agreed plans to ensure repayment when due. The current annual losses of around Rs 28,000 crore make repayment highly uncertain. The central undertakings that are thejr main suppliers have payment security because the government will come to their help. Private enterprises do not have such assurance and are concerned about payment security, that must be resolved. By the late 1890s, improving the SEB finances was recognised as fundamental to power reform. Unbundling SEBs, working under corporate discipline and even privatisation and not vertically integrated state enterprises, are necessary for efficient and finandally viable electricity enterprises. Since government will not distance itself from managing them, privatising is an option. The Delhi model has worked. But. it receives no public support. The Electricity Act 2003, the APRDP (Accelerated Power Reform and Development Programme) with its incentives and · penalties, and the creation of independent regulatory commissions, were the means to bring about reforms to improve financial viability of power sector Implementation has been half-hearted and results disappointing. The concurrent nature of electricity in the Constitutiort impedes power sector improvement. States are more responsive to populist pressures than the central government, and less inclined to take drastic action against electricity thieves. Captive power would add significantly to capacity. I However, captive generation, three years after the Act enabled it, has added little to capacity because rules for open access , were delayed. Redefined captive generation avoids state vetoes on purchase lr sale of electricity except to state electricity enterprises. Mandating open access on state-owned wires to power regardless of ownership and customer would encourage electricity trading. The Act recognised electncity trading as a separate activity. A surcharge on transmission chsrges will pay for cross-subsidies. These were to be eliminated m time. Rules for open access and the quantum of surcharge by each state commission (under broad principles defined by the central commission) have yet to be announced by same. The few who have announced the surcharge have kept it so high that no tradmg can take place. Which of the following is the reason for apathy of private investors in power sector?

    Amartya Sen wrote about the Indian tradition of skepticism and heterodoxy of opinion that led to high levels of intellectual argument. The power sector in India is a victim of this tradition at its worst. Instead of forcefully communicating, supporting and honestly and firmly implementing policies, people just debate them. It is argued that central undertakings produce power at lower tariffs and must therefore build most of the required extra capacities. This is a delusion. They no longer have access to low- cost government fonds. Uncertainty about payment reillains a reason for the hesitation of private investment. They had to sell only to SEBs (State Electricity Boards). SEB balance sheets are cleaner after . the ''securitisation" of the Rs 40,000 crore or so owed by SEBs to central government undertakings, now shown as debt instruments. But state governments have not implemented agreed plans to ensure repayment when due. The current annual losses of around Rs 28,000 crore make repayment highly uncertain. The central undertakings that are thejr main suppliers have payment security because the government will come to their help. Private enterprises do not have such assurance and are concerned about payment security, that must be resolved. By the late 1890s, improving the SEB finances was recognised as fundamental to power reform. Unbundling SEBs, working under corporate discipline and even privatisation and not vertically integrated state enterprises, are necessary for efficient and finandally viable electricity enterprises. Since government will not distance itself from managing them, privatising is an option. The Delhi model has worked. But. it receives no public support. The Electricity Act 2003, the APRDP (Accelerated Power Reform and Development Programme) with its incentives and · penalties, and the creation of independent regulatory commissions, were the means to bring about reforms to improve financial viability of power sector Implementation has been half-hearted and results disappointing. The concurrent nature of electricity in the Constitutiort impedes power sector improvement. States are more responsive to populist pressures than the central government, and less inclined to take drastic action against electricity thieves. Captive power would add significantly to capacity. I However, captive generation, three years after the Act enabled it, has added little to capacity because rules for open access , were delayed. Redefined captive generation avoids state vetoes on purchase lr sale of electricity except to state electricity enterprises. Mandating open access on state-owned wires to power regardless of ownership and customer would encourage electricity trading. The Act recognised electncity trading as a separate activity. A surcharge on transmission chsrges will pay for cross-subsidies. These were to be eliminated m time. Rules for open access and the quantum of surcharge by each state commission (under broad principles defined by the central commission) have yet to be announced by same. The few who have announced the surcharge have kept it so high that no tradmg can take place. What was tµe serious omission on the part of the State Government?

    Amartya Sen wrote about the Indian tradition of skepticism and heterodoxy of opinion that led to high levels of intellectual argument. The power sector in India is a victim of this tradition at its worst. Instead of forcefully communicating, supporting and honestly and firmly implementing policies, people just debate them. It is argued that central undertakings produce power at lower tariffs and must therefore build most of the required extra capacities. This is a delusion. They no longer have access to low- cost government fonds. Uncertainty about payment reillains a reason for the hesitation of private investment. They had to sell only to SEBs (State Electricity Boards). SEB balance sheets are cleaner after . the ''securitisation" of the Rs 40,000 crore or so owed by SEBs to central government undertakings, now shown as debt instruments. But state governments have not implemented agreed plans to ensure repayment when due. The current annual losses of around Rs 28,000 crore make repayment highly uncertain. The central undertakings that are thejr main suppliers have payment security because the government will come to their help. Private enterprises do not have such assurance and are concerned about payment security, that must be resolved. By the late 1890s, improving the SEB finances was recognised as fundamental to power reform. Unbundling SEBs, working under corporate discipline and even privatisation and not vertically integrated state enterprises, are necessary for efficient and finandally viable electricity enterprises. Since government will not distance itself from managing them, privatising is an option. The Delhi model has worked. But. it receives no public support. The Electricity Act 2003, the APRDP (Accelerated Power Reform and Development Programme) with its incentives and · penalties, and the creation of independent regulatory commissions, were the means to bring about reforms to improve financial viability of power sector Implementation has been half-hearted and results disappointing. The concurrent nature of electricity in the Constitutiort impedes power sector improvement. States are more responsive to populist pressures than the central government, and less inclined to take drastic action against electricity thieves. Captive power would add significantly to capacity. I However, captive generation, three years after the Act enabled it, has added little to capacity because rules for open access , were delayed. Redefined captive generation avoids state vetoes on purchase lr sale of electricity except to state electricity enterprises. Mandating open access on state-owned wires to power regardless of ownership and customer would encourage electricity trading. The Act recognised electncity trading as a separate activity. A surcharge on transmission chsrges will pay for cross-subsidies. These were to be eliminated m time. Rules for open access and the quantum of surcharge by each state commission (under broad principles defined by the central commission) have yet to be announced by same. The few who have announced the surcharge have kept it so high that no tradmg can take place. Which of the following is/are considered necessary for improving performance of electricity enterprises? A Corporate work culture B. Privatisation C. Properly integrated state enterprises

    Amartya Sen wrote about the Indian tradition of skepticism and heterodoxy of opinion that led to high levels of intellectual argument. The power sector in India is a victim of this tradition at its worst. Instead of forcefully communicating, supporting and honestly and firmly implementing policies, people just debate them. It is argued that central undertakings produce power at lower tariffs and must therefore build most of the required extra capacities. This is a delusion. They no longer have access to low- cost government fonds. Uncertainty about payment reillains a reason for the hesitation of private investment. They had to sell only to SEBs (State Electricity Boards). SEB balance sheets are cleaner after . the ''securitisation" of the Rs 40,000 crore or so owed by SEBs to central government undertakings, now shown as debt instruments. But state governments have not implemented agreed plans to ensure repayment when due. The current annual losses of around Rs 28,000 crore make repayment highly uncertain. The central undertakings that are thejr main suppliers have payment security because the government will come to their help. Private enterprises do not have such assurance and are concerned about payment security, that must be resolved. By the late 1890s, improving the SEB finances was recognised as fundamental to power reform. Unbundling SEBs, working under corporate discipline and even privatisation and not vertically integrated state enterprises, are necessary for efficient and finandally viable electricity enterprises. Since government will not distance itself from managing them, privatising is an option. The Delhi model has worked. But. it receives no public support. The Electricity Act 2003, the APRDP (Accelerated Power Reform and Development Programme) with its incentives and · penalties, and the creation of independent regulatory commissions, were the means to bring about reforms to improve financial viability of power sector Implementation has been half-hearted and results disappointing. The concurrent nature of electricity in the Constitutiort impedes power sector improvement. States are more responsive to populist pressures than the central government, and less inclined to take drastic action against electricity thieves. Captive power would add significantly to capacity. I However, captive generation, three years after the Act enabled it, has added little to capacity because rules for open access , were delayed. Redefined captive generation avoids state vetoes on purchase lr sale of electricity except to state electricity enterprises. Mandating open access on state-owned wires to power regardless of ownership and customer would encourage electricity trading. The Act recognised electncity trading as a separate activity. A surcharge on transmission chsrges will pay for cross-subsidies. These were to be eliminated m time. Rules for open access and the quantum of surcharge by each state commission (under broad principles defined by the central commission) have yet to be announced by same. The few who have announced the surcharge have kept it so high that no tradmg can take place. The example of "Delhi Model " quoted by the author underlines his feelings of A. happiness about its success. B. unhappiness for lack of public support C. disgust towards privatisation

    Amartya Sen wrote about the Indian tradition of skepticism and heterodoxy of opinion that led to high levels of intellectual argument. The power sector in India is a victim of this tradition at its worst. Instead of forcefully communicating, supporting and honestly and firmly implementing policies, people just debate them. It is argued that central undertakings produce power at lower tariffs and must therefore build most of the required extra capacities. This is a delusion. They no longer have access to low- cost government fonds. Uncertainty about payment reillains a reason for the hesitation of private investment. They had to sell only to SEBs (State Electricity Boards). SEB balance sheets are cleaner after . the ''securitisation" of the Rs 40,000 crore or so owed by SEBs to central government undertakings, now shown as debt instruments. But state governments have not implemented agreed plans to ensure repayment when due. The current annual losses of around Rs 28,000 crore make repayment highly uncertain. The central undertakings that are thejr main suppliers have payment security because the government will come to their help. Private enterprises do not have such assurance and are concerned about payment security, that must be resolved. By the late 1890s, improving the SEB finances was recognised as fundamental to power reform. Unbundling SEBs, working under corporate discipline and even privatisation and not vertically integrated state enterprises, are necessary for efficient and finandally viable electricity enterprises. Since government will not distance itself from managing them, privatising is an option. The Delhi model has worked. But. it receives no public support. The Electricity Act 2003, the APRDP (Accelerated Power Reform and Development Programme) with its incentives and · penalties, and the creation of independent regulatory commissions, were the means to bring about reforms to improve financial viability of power sector Implementation has been half-hearted and results disappointing. The concurrent nature of electricity in the Constitutiort impedes power sector improvement. States are more responsive to populist pressures than the central government, and less inclined to take drastic action against electricity thieves. Captive power would add significantly to capacity. I However, captive generation, three years after the Act enabled it, has added little to capacity because rules for open access , were delayed. Redefined captive generation avoids state vetoes on purchase lr sale of electricity except to state electricity enterprises. Mandating open access on state-owned wires to power regardless of ownership and customer would encourage electricity trading. The Act recognised electncity trading as a separate activity. A surcharge on transmission chsrges will pay for cross-subsidies. These were to be eliminated m time. Rules for open access and the quantum of surcharge by each state commission (under broad principles defined by the central commission) have yet to be announced by same. The few who have announced the surcharge have kept it so high that no tradmg can take place. Which of the following was/were not considered as the instrument(s) to accomplish financial well-being of power sector?

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