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In the context of conservation of natura...

In the context of conservation of natural resources, explain the terms reduce, recycle and reuse. From among the materials that we use in daily life, identify two materials for each category.

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**Step-by-Step Solution:** 1. **Understanding the Terms:** - **Reduce:** This term refers to minimizing the amount of resources we consume. It involves using less of a material or commodity to decrease waste and conserve natural resources. - **Recycle:** Recycling is the process of collecting used materials and sending them back to manufacturers to be transformed into new products. This helps in reducing the need for raw materials and lowers environmental impact. - **Reuse:** Reusing means using an item multiple times instead of discarding it after a single use. This practice conserves resources and reduces waste. 2. **Identifying Materials for Each Category:** ...
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In the context of conservation of natural resources, explain the term reduce. Identify any one material for this category.

Two small angled transparent prisms (each or refracting angle A = 1^(@)) are so placed that their bases coincide, so that common base is BC. This device is called Fresnel's biprism and is used to obtain coherent sources of a point source S illuminated by monochromatic light of wavelength 6000 Å placed at a distance a = 20 cm. Calculate the separation between coherent sources. If a screen is placed at a distance b = 80 cm. from the device, what ist the finge which of fringes obtained (Refractive index of material of each prism = 1.5.)

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  • Below is the beginning excerpt from Meditations on First Philosophy, by Rene Descartes, 1641, in which he muses about the nature of knowledge. MEDITATION I. of the Things of Which We May Now Doubt 1. SEVERAL years have now elapsed since I first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful, and from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions had adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the foundation, if l desired to establish a firm and abiding superstructure in the sciences. But as this enterprise appeared to me to be one of great magnitude, I waited until I had attained an age so mature as to leave me no hope that at any stage of life more advanced I should be better able to execute my design. On this account, I have delayed so long that I should henceforth consider I was doing wrong were I still to consume in deliberation any of the time that now remains for action. Today, then, since I have opportunely freed my mind from all cares [and am happily disturbed by no passions), and since I am in the secure possession of leisure in a peaceable retirement, I will at length apply myself earnestly and freely to the general overthrow of all my former opinions. 2. But, to this end, it will not be necessary for me to show that the whole of these are false-a point, perhaps, which I shall never reach, but as even now my reason convinces me that I ought not the less carefully to withhold belief from what is not entirely certain and indubitable, than from what is manifestly false, it will be sufficient to justify the rejection of the whole if I shall find in each some ground for doubt. Nor for this purpose will it be necessary even to deal with each belief individually, which would be truly an endless labor, but, as the removal from below of the foundation necessarily involves the downfall of the whole edifice, I will at once approach the criticism of the principles on which all my former beliefs rested. 3. All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us, and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived. 4. But it may be said, perhaps, that, although the senses occasionally mislead us respecting minute objects, and such as are so far removed from us as to be beyond the reach of close observation, there are yet many other of their informations (presentations), of the truth of which it is manifestly impossible to doubt, as for example, that I am in this place, seated by the fire, clothed in a winter dressing gown, that I hold in My hands this piece of paper, with other intimations of the same nature. But how could I deny that I possess these hands and this body, and withal escape being classed with persons in a state of insanity, whose brains are so disordered and clouded by dark bilious vapors as to cause them pertinaciously to assert that they are monarchs when they are in the greatest poverty, or clothed lin gold) and purple when destitute of any covering: or that their head is made of clay, their body of glass, or that they are gourds? I should certainly be not less insane than they, were I to regulate my procedure according to examples so extravagant. descartes' overall attitude towards knowledge as presented in the passage is best described as

    A
    dogmatic
    B
    credulous
    C
    skeptical
    D
    popular
  • Below is the beginning excerpt from Meditations on First Philosophy, by Rene Descartes, 1641, in which he muses about the nature of knowledge. MEDITATION I. of the Things of Which We May Now Doubt 1. SEVERAL years have now elapsed since I first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful, and from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions had adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the foundation, if l desired to establish a firm and abiding superstructure in the sciences. But as this enterprise appeared to me to be one of great magnitude, I waited until I had attained an age so mature as to leave me no hope that at any stage of life more advanced I should be better able to execute my design. On this account, I have delayed so long that I should henceforth consider I was doing wrong were I still to consume in deliberation any of the time that now remains for action. Today, then, since I have opportunely freed my mind from all cares [and am happily disturbed by no passions), and since I am in the secure possession of leisure in a peaceable retirement, I will at length apply myself earnestly and freely to the general overthrow of all my former opinions. 2. But, to this end, it will not be necessary for me to show that the whole of these are false-a point, perhaps, which I shall never reach, but as even now my reason convinces me that I ought not the less carefully to withhold belief from what is not entirely certain and indubitable, than from what is manifestly false, it will be sufficient to justify the rejection of the whole if I shall find in each some ground for doubt. Nor for this purpose will it be necessary even to deal with each belief individually, which would be truly an endless labor, but, as the removal from below of the foundation necessarily involves the downfall of the whole edifice, I will at once approach the criticism of the principles on which all my former beliefs rested. 3. All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us, and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived. 4. But it may be said, perhaps, that, although the senses occasionally mislead us respecting minute objects, and such as are so far removed from us as to be beyond the reach of close observation, there are yet many other of their informations (presentations), of the truth of which it is manifestly impossible to doubt, as for example, that I am in this place, seated by the fire, clothed in a winter dressing gown, that I hold in My hands this piece of paper, with other intimations of the same nature. But how could I deny that I possess these hands and this body, and withal escape being classed with persons in a state of insanity, whose brains are so disordered and clouded by dark bilious vapors as to cause them pertinaciously to assert that they are monarchs when they are in the greatest poverty, or clothed lin gold) and purple when destitute of any covering: or that their head is made of clay, their body of glass, or that they are gourds? I should certainly be not less insane than they, were I to regulate my procedure according to examples so extravagant. descartes uses lines 8-13 to express why

    A
    he believes that the foundations for knowledge are error ridden
    B
    the intellectual project he is tackling is so improtant
    C
    his mental and physical health have begun to decline.
    D
    he has chosen this point in time to write this work.
  • Below is the beginning excerpt from Meditations on First Philosophy, by Rene Descartes, 1641, in which he muses about the nature of knowledge. MEDITATION I. of the Things of Which We May Now Doubt 1. SEVERAL years have now elapsed since I first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful, and from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions had adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the foundation, if l desired to establish a firm and abiding superstructure in the sciences. But as this enterprise appeared to me to be one of great magnitude, I waited until I had attained an age so mature as to leave me no hope that at any stage of life more advanced I should be better able to execute my design. On this account, I have delayed so long that I should henceforth consider I was doing wrong were I still to consume in deliberation any of the time that now remains for action. Today, then, since I have opportunely freed my mind from all cares [and am happily disturbed by no passions), and since I am in the secure possession of leisure in a peaceable retirement, I will at length apply myself earnestly and freely to the general overthrow of all my former opinions. 2. But, to this end, it will not be necessary for me to show that the whole of these are false-a point, perhaps, which I shall never reach, but as even now my reason convinces me that I ought not the less carefully to withhold belief from what is not entirely certain and indubitable, than from what is manifestly false, it will be sufficient to justify the rejection of the whole if I shall find in each some ground for doubt. Nor for this purpose will it be necessary even to deal with each belief individually, which would be truly an endless labor, but, as the removal from below of the foundation necessarily involves the downfall of the whole edifice, I will at once approach the criticism of the principles on which all my former beliefs rested. 3. All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us, and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived. 4. But it may be said, perhaps, that, although the senses occasionally mislead us respecting minute objects, and such as are so far removed from us as to be beyond the reach of close observation, there are yet many other of their informations (presentations), of the truth of which it is manifestly impossible to doubt, as for example, that I am in this place, seated by the fire, clothed in a winter dressing gown, that I hold in My hands this piece of paper, with other intimations of the same nature. But how could I deny that I possess these hands and this body, and withal escape being classed with persons in a state of insanity, whose brains are so disordered and clouded by dark bilious vapors as to cause them pertinaciously to assert that they are monarchs when they are in the greatest poverty, or clothed lin gold) and purple when destitute of any covering: or that their head is made of clay, their body of glass, or that they are gourds? I should certainly be not less insane than they, were I to regulate my procedure according to examples so extravagant. as used in line 10, the word "advanced" most closely means

    A
    increasingly complex
    B
    far along in time.
    C
    with great skill
    D
    significantly improved.
  • Similar Questions

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    Below is the beginning excerpt from Meditations on First Philosophy, by Rene Descartes, 1641, in which he muses about the nature of knowledge. MEDITATION I. of the Things of Which We May Now Doubt 1. SEVERAL years have now elapsed since I first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful, and from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions had adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the foundation, if l desired to establish a firm and abiding superstructure in the sciences. But as this enterprise appeared to me to be one of great magnitude, I waited until I had attained an age so mature as to leave me no hope that at any stage of life more advanced I should be better able to execute my design. On this account, I have delayed so long that I should henceforth consider I was doing wrong were I still to consume in deliberation any of the time that now remains for action. Today, then, since I have opportunely freed my mind from all cares [and am happily disturbed by no passions), and since I am in the secure possession of leisure in a peaceable retirement, I will at length apply myself earnestly and freely to the general overthrow of all my former opinions. 2. But, to this end, it will not be necessary for me to show that the whole of these are false-a point, perhaps, which I shall never reach, but as even now my reason convinces me that I ought not the less carefully to withhold belief from what is not entirely certain and indubitable, than from what is manifestly false, it will be sufficient to justify the rejection of the whole if I shall find in each some ground for doubt. Nor for this purpose will it be necessary even to deal with each belief individually, which would be truly an endless labor, but, as the removal from below of the foundation necessarily involves the downfall of the whole edifice, I will at once approach the criticism of the principles on which all my former beliefs rested. 3. All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us, and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived. 4. But it may be said, perhaps, that, although the senses occasionally mislead us respecting minute objects, and such as are so far removed from us as to be beyond the reach of close observation, there are yet many other of their informations (presentations), of the truth of which it is manifestly impossible to doubt, as for example, that I am in this place, seated by the fire, clothed in a winter dressing gown, that I hold in My hands this piece of paper, with other intimations of the same nature. But how could I deny that I possess these hands and this body, and withal escape being classed with persons in a state of insanity, whose brains are so disordered and clouded by dark bilious vapors as to cause them pertinaciously to assert that they are monarchs when they are in the greatest poverty, or clothed lin gold) and purple when destitute of any covering: or that their head is made of clay, their body of glass, or that they are gourds? I should certainly be not less insane than they, were I to regulate my procedure according to examples so extravagant. descartes' minimal threshold for dismissing a knowledge chaim is if it is

    Below is the beginning excerpt from Meditations on First Philosophy, by Rene Descartes, 1641, in which he muses about the nature of knowledge. MEDITATION I. of the Things of Which We May Now Doubt 1. SEVERAL years have now elapsed since I first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful, and from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions had adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the foundation, if l desired to establish a firm and abiding superstructure in the sciences. But as this enterprise appeared to me to be one of great magnitude, I waited until I had attained an age so mature as to leave me no hope that at any stage of life more advanced I should be better able to execute my design. On this account, I have delayed so long that I should henceforth consider I was doing wrong were I still to consume in deliberation any of the time that now remains for action. Today, then, since I have opportunely freed my mind from all cares [and am happily disturbed by no passions), and since I am in the secure possession of leisure in a peaceable retirement, I will at length apply myself earnestly and freely to the general overthrow of all my former opinions. 2. But, to this end, it will not be necessary for me to show that the whole of these are false-a point, perhaps, which I shall never reach, but as even now my reason convinces me that I ought not the less carefully to withhold belief from what is not entirely certain and indubitable, than from what is manifestly false, it will be sufficient to justify the rejection of the whole if I shall find in each some ground for doubt. Nor for this purpose will it be necessary even to deal with each belief individually, which would be truly an endless labor, but, as the removal from below of the foundation necessarily involves the downfall of the whole edifice, I will at once approach the criticism of the principles on which all my former beliefs rested. 3. All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us, and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived. 4. But it may be said, perhaps, that, although the senses occasionally mislead us respecting minute objects, and such as are so far removed from us as to be beyond the reach of close observation, there are yet many other of their informations (presentations), of the truth of which it is manifestly impossible to doubt, as for example, that I am in this place, seated by the fire, clothed in a winter dressing gown, that I hold in My hands this piece of paper, with other intimations of the same nature. But how could I deny that I possess these hands and this body, and withal escape being classed with persons in a state of insanity, whose brains are so disordered and clouded by dark bilious vapors as to cause them pertinaciously to assert that they are monarchs when they are in the greatest poverty, or clothed lin gold) and purple when destitute of any covering: or that their head is made of clay, their body of glass, or that they are gourds? I should certainly be not less insane than they, were I to regulate my procedure according to examples so extravagant. which option gives the best evidence for the answer to the previous question?

    Below is the beginning excerpt from Meditations on First Philosophy, by Rene Descartes, 1641, in which he muses about the nature of knowledge. MEDITATION I. of the Things of Which We May Now Doubt 1. SEVERAL years have now elapsed since I first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful, and from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions had adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the foundation, if l desired to establish a firm and abiding superstructure in the sciences. But as this enterprise appeared to me to be one of great magnitude, I waited until I had attained an age so mature as to leave me no hope that at any stage of life more advanced I should be better able to execute my design. On this account, I have delayed so long that I should henceforth consider I was doing wrong were I still to consume in deliberation any of the time that now remains for action. Today, then, since I have opportunely freed my mind from all cares [and am happily disturbed by no passions), and since I am in the secure possession of leisure in a peaceable retirement, I will at length apply myself earnestly and freely to the general overthrow of all my former opinions. 2. But, to this end, it will not be necessary for me to show that the whole of these are false-a point, perhaps, which I shall never reach, but as even now my reason convinces me that I ought not the less carefully to withhold belief from what is not entirely certain and indubitable, than from what is manifestly false, it will be sufficient to justify the rejection of the whole if I shall find in each some ground for doubt. Nor for this purpose will it be necessary even to deal with each belief individually, which would be truly an endless labor, but, as the removal from below of the foundation necessarily involves the downfall of the whole edifice, I will at once approach the criticism of the principles on which all my former beliefs rested. 3. All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us, and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived. 4. But it may be said, perhaps, that, although the senses occasionally mislead us respecting minute objects, and such as are so far removed from us as to be beyond the reach of close observation, there are yet many other of their informations (presentations), of the truth of which it is manifestly impossible to doubt, as for example, that I am in this place, seated by the fire, clothed in a winter dressing gown, that I hold in My hands this piece of paper, with other intimations of the same nature. But how could I deny that I possess these hands and this body, and withal escape being classed with persons in a state of insanity, whose brains are so disordered and clouded by dark bilious vapors as to cause them pertinaciously to assert that they are monarchs when they are in the greatest poverty, or clothed lin gold) and purple when destitute of any covering: or that their head is made of clay, their body of glass, or that they are gourds? I should certainly be not less insane than they, were I to regulate my procedure according to examples so extravagant. lines 30-35 primarily illustrate descartes' thinking about

    Below is the beginning excerpt from Meditations on First Philosophy, by Rene Descartes, 1641, in which he muses about the nature of knowledge. MEDITATION I. of the Things of Which We May Now Doubt 1. SEVERAL years have now elapsed since I first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful, and from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions had adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the foundation, if l desired to establish a firm and abiding superstructure in the sciences. But as this enterprise appeared to me to be one of great magnitude, I waited until I had attained an age so mature as to leave me no hope that at any stage of life more advanced I should be better able to execute my design. On this account, I have delayed so long that I should henceforth consider I was doing wrong were I still to consume in deliberation any of the time that now remains for action. Today, then, since I have opportunely freed my mind from all cares [and am happily disturbed by no passions), and since I am in the secure possession of leisure in a peaceable retirement, I will at length apply myself earnestly and freely to the general overthrow of all my former opinions. 2. But, to this end, it will not be necessary for me to show that the whole of these are false-a point, perhaps, which I shall never reach, but as even now my reason convinces me that I ought not the less carefully to withhold belief from what is not entirely certain and indubitable, than from what is manifestly false, it will be sufficient to justify the rejection of the whole if I shall find in each some ground for doubt. Nor for this purpose will it be necessary even to deal with each belief individually, which would be truly an endless labor, but, as the removal from below of the foundation necessarily involves the downfall of the whole edifice, I will at once approach the criticism of the principles on which all my former beliefs rested. 3. All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us, and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived. 4. But it may be said, perhaps, that, although the senses occasionally mislead us respecting minute objects, and such as are so far removed from us as to be beyond the reach of close observation, there are yet many other of their informations (presentations), of the truth of which it is manifestly impossible to doubt, as for example, that I am in this place, seated by the fire, clothed in a winter dressing gown, that I hold in My hands this piece of paper, with other intimations of the same nature. But how could I deny that I possess these hands and this body, and withal escape being classed with persons in a state of insanity, whose brains are so disordered and clouded by dark bilious vapors as to cause them pertinaciously to assert that they are monarchs when they are in the greatest poverty, or clothed lin gold) and purple when destitute of any covering: or that their head is made of clay, their body of glass, or that they are gourds? I should certainly be not less insane than they, were I to regulate my procedure according to examples so extravagant. the passage strongly implies that descartes believes that the structure of knowledge is best described as

    Below is the beginning excerpt from Meditations on First Philosophy, by Rene Descartes, 1641, in which he muses about the nature of knowledge. MEDITATION I. of the Things of Which We May Now Doubt 1. SEVERAL years have now elapsed since I first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful, and from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions had adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the foundation, if l desired to establish a firm and abiding superstructure in the sciences. But as this enterprise appeared to me to be one of great magnitude, I waited until I had attained an age so mature as to leave me no hope that at any stage of life more advanced I should be better able to execute my design. On this account, I have delayed so long that I should henceforth consider I was doing wrong were I still to consume in deliberation any of the time that now remains for action. Today, then, since I have opportunely freed my mind from all cares [and am happily disturbed by no passions), and since I am in the secure possession of leisure in a peaceable retirement, I will at length apply myself earnestly and freely to the general overthrow of all my former opinions. 2. But, to this end, it will not be necessary for me to show that the whole of these are false-a point, perhaps, which I shall never reach, but as even now my reason convinces me that I ought not the less carefully to withhold belief from what is not entirely certain and indubitable, than from what is manifestly false, it will be sufficient to justify the rejection of the whole if I shall find in each some ground for doubt. Nor for this purpose will it be necessary even to deal with each belief individually, which would be truly an endless labor, but, as the removal from below of the foundation necessarily involves the downfall of the whole edifice, I will at once approach the criticism of the principles on which all my former beliefs rested. 3. All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us, and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived. 4. But it may be said, perhaps, that, although the senses occasionally mislead us respecting minute objects, and such as are so far removed from us as to be beyond the reach of close observation, there are yet many other of their informations (presentations), of the truth of which it is manifestly impossible to doubt, as for example, that I am in this place, seated by the fire, clothed in a winter dressing gown, that I hold in My hands this piece of paper, with other intimations of the same nature. But how could I deny that I possess these hands and this body, and withal escape being classed with persons in a state of insanity, whose brains are so disordered and clouded by dark bilious vapors as to cause them pertinaciously to assert that they are monarchs when they are in the greatest poverty, or clothed lin gold) and purple when destitute of any covering: or that their head is made of clay, their body of glass, or that they are gourds? I should certainly be not less insane than they, were I to regulate my procedure according to examples so extravagant. which option gives the best evidenced for the answer to the previous question?